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COMMENTARY: IMPLICATIONS OF NEW
PHYSICIAN PAYMENT METHODS FOR
ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE AND
PHYSICIAN FIDELITY TO
PATIENTS' INTERESTS
Daniel W Brock*
INTRODUCTION

J

HAVE NO FUNDAMENTAL disagreements with Professor
Capron's analysis of the ethical implications of changes in the
methods of paying physicians in the name of containing health care
costs. In particular, I believe he is correct that the two central questions are the likely effects on patients' access to health care and on
physicians' fidelity to patient interests in health care decisionmaking. I would, however, like to expand on the implications of new
physician payment methods on these two questions. Thus, I will
abandon the role of critic in favor of offering a sympathetic extension of his position.
I.

EFFECTS ON

ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE

Proposals to change methods of physician payment, such as
those Professor Capron considers, are driven by two principal motivations. The first is that of the economist and health policy analyst
who views the incentives for health care utilization in traditional
fee-for-service settings as irrational, leading to significant overutilization of health care. Both physicians and patients with health
insurance have incentives to employ any and all health care promising positive medical benefits to the patient-regardless of its costat least in the limited case of insurance providing full, first-dollar
coverage. Such incentives lead to overutilization of health care at
the expense of other possible uses of monetary resources that could
produce greater benefits.
Two of the three payment strategies Professor Capron considers-limiting the amount and type of services used and shifting fi*
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nancial risks for providing patient care to physicians-are explicitly
designed to rationalize the incentive structure used in utilization decisions by providing physicians with incentives to weigh the costs as
well as the medical benefits of possible care. His third strategy
seeks to rationalize the relative compensation for different types of
health care within the existing Customary-Prevailing-Reasonable
(CPR) method in order to remove distortions in incentives which
encourage employing highly reimbursed services that may be less
cost effective for the patient. Such distortions include incentives
that favor procedures over consultation with patients.
The other principal motivation is budgetary-the desire of third
party payors, such as the federal government and corporations, to
contain health care costs so as to reduce their overall outlays for
health care. Once again, the two strategies of limiting the amount
and type of services used as well as shifting to physicians the financial risks in providing care are both designed to contain the amount,
and in turn the costs, of services used. Strategies that limit unit
prices for services will not alone limit overall costs. But, as Professor Capron notes, part of the attraction of variants, such as the relative value scale, is that they are combined with a monetary
conversion factor which can be adjusted to control overall
expenditures.
Both of these motivations aim at reducing overall expenditures,
or at least the rate of increase in overall expenditures, on health
care. In turn, they are expected to reduce physicians' overall compensation as well. Reducing overutilization will shift resources to
non-health care uses that promise greater benefits from the use of
those resources than does some health care. In an increasingly
competitive setting, there is no reason to believe that physicians will
be able to increase their fees sufficiently to balance the decline in
federal expenditures. Likewise, the motivation of reducing overall
budgetary outlays will not raise the physicians' share of those outlays to compensate for the expenditure reduction. While the effects
on physician incomes will, of course, not be uniform across areas,
specialties, or individual physicians, these proposals seem likely to
worsen the overall financial status of physicians as a group. The
widely anticipated oversupply of physicians will only exacerbate
these effects. Attempts by physicians merely to maintain income
levels will create pressures to reduce the provision of unreimbursed
or underreimbursed (in comparison with their usual fees) care.
If the commitment to provide free care to those in need and
unable to pay were sufficiently firm, the provision of such care
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would remain constant rather than decline along with physicians'
incomes. However, there are a variety of factors aside from costcontainment efforts that are likely to lead to a weakening of that
commitment. One of the more important is the increasing commercialization of health care that is most evident in the growth of large
investor-owned hospital chains.' The debate about the growth of
for-profit health care is unduly polarized, and the changes the forprofits represent are commonly exaggerated. Nevertheless, there is
a genuine and important difference between the ethos of medicine
and that of business.
The ethos of medicine is one of commitment and service to
others in need of health care without regard to their ability to pay.
While there are, of course, physicians who are primarily concerned
with their own economic and other interests, they are viewed and
condemned as deviants by that ethos. Not so, however, in commerce. Although oversimplified, the business community commonly believes that individuals pursuing their own economic
interests, though admittedly within some ethical and legal constraints, will best promote the overall social good. If medicine continues to become increasingly commercialized, as many expect, and
the motivation of self-interest is increasingly viewed as ethically acceptable, the commitment to serve those in need regardless of their
ability to pay can be expected to weaken. Others serving basic
human needs in commercial contexts, such as supermarket owners
and landlords, do not generally serve those unable to pay.
If these and other forces increasingly press physicians to question the extent to which they are in fact ethically obligated to provide health care to those unable to pay, whether through health
insurance or other means, there is some reason to think they will
conclude that the obligation to ensure access to health care for all is
not theirs, either as individuals or as an organized profession. This
conclusion conveniently avoids either significant self-sacrifice or bad
conscience. But more important, I believe they will be correct in
concluding that the principal obligation lies elsewhere. I do not
question whether there is an obligation to ensure access to all to an
adequate level of health care, but only whose obligation it is.
There are several reasons for holding that this ethical obligation
ultimately belongs to the federal government.' First, the obligation
1. See generally Brock & Buchanan, Ethical Issues in For-ProfitHealth Care, in FORPROFIT ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH CARE

(1986).

2. The position in this paragraph closely follows the report of THE PRESIDENT'S COM-
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to secure a just or fair overall distribution of benefits and burdens
across society is usually understood to be a general societal obligation. Second, the federal government is the institution society commonly employs to meet society-wide distributive requirements. The
federal government possesses two sorts of powers generally lacking
in other institutions, including state and local governments, that are
necessary in meeting this obligation fairly. With its taxing power, it
has the revenue-raising capacities to finance the massively expensive
program that would be required by any reasonable account of an
adequate level of guaranteed health care for all. This taxing power
also allows the burden of financing health care for the poor to be
spread fairly across all members of society. Financing health care
should not depend on the vagaries of how wealthy or poor a state or
local area happens to be.
With its nationwide scope, the federal government also has the
power to coordinate programs guaranteeing access to health care to
the poor across state and local boundaries. This is important both
for reducing inefficiencies that allow substantial numbers of the
poor and uninsured to fall between the cracks in the patchwork of
state and local programs and for ensuring that there are not great
disparities in the minimum of health care guaranteed to all in different locales within our country. The obligation ultimately rests with
the federal and not state government. However, in the face of failure by the federal government to fully meet that obligation, recent
efforts by state governments to improve access are obviously to be
welcomed.
From the physician's perspective, viewing the obligation to ensure access for all as the individual physician's responsibility will
inevitably be seen as distributing unfairly the burden of providing
access. It is unfair that the burden fall only on physicians and not
on all members of society, and it is unfair that the burden be distributed among individual physicians according to the extent that their
practice happens to bring them patients unable to pay. Thus, physicians can and will correctly conclude that the ethical obligation to
provide access to those unable to pay belongs ultimately to society
and specifically to the federal government-not to physicians alone.
Physicians can increasingly expect to find themselves in essentially the same dilemma that confronts health care institutions as a
result of various cost-containment measures. These measures make
MISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, 1 SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 31 (1983).
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cross-subsidization, the traditional method utilized by institutions
to provide unreimbursed care to the poor, less feasible. As the excess reimbursement over costs from paying patients is reduced,
there are fewer resources available to subsidize the poor. Instead of
an institutional balance sheet that is of concern to the hospital, the
physician must now worry about maintaining his or her admittedly
high income level.
The failure of society to confront and remedy the problem of
access to care often places individual physicians, as well as many
health care institutions, in an ethically impossible situation. On the
one hand, physicians or hospitals can turn away the needy who in
fact do have a moral right, though often no legal entitlement, to an
adequate level of health care. On the other hand, physicians or hospitals that serve areas with an unusually high proportion of persons
unable to pay for health care can attempt to serve all those in need
and thereby jeopardize their own financial viability, providing more
aid to the needy than required by any moral obligation. Plainly,
neither alternative is ethically acceptable. At the level of the individual physician, just as at the level of the individual hospital, the
problem will become increasingly difficult to solve if the access
problem worsens while cost-containment measures make cross-subsidization increasingly infeasible and burdensome. The problem
can only be dealt with at a broader institutional or societal level
with programs that directly attack the access problem.
Professor Capron is correct in noting that the various proposals
for changing how physicians are paid would likely have differential
effects on access to care. But it is important to emphasize that all of
the proposals would likely further obstruct access to health care.
Moreover, this would occur in a context in which other factors,
such as the increasing commercialization of health care, seriously
can exacerbate those effects. It is a shameful injustice that some
thirty million Americans are without access to a regular source of
health care. Virtually all other Western industrialized countries, including countries significantly less wealthy than the United States,
have been more successful than we have been in ensuring access to
health care to all their citizens. Any of the proposals now being
seriously considered for changing how physicians are paid can be
predicted to worsen access. I believe this only strengthens the case
that the problem of the first moral importance in our health care
system-and of higher moral priority than containing health care
costs-is improving access to health care.
There is some plausibility to the claim that, as a matter of polit-
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ical reality, it is unreasonable to expect any significant extension of
access to health care until health care costs are brought under better
control. But if this is so, it only means that efforts to improve access require accompanying efforts to control costs. What should
not occur, but is in very real danger of occurring, is the shunting
aside of the problem of access in the face of third-party payors'
desires to control costs. Thus, instead of emphasizing the different
effects on access to health care of the various proposals to change
how physicians are paid, I would emphasize the likely negative impact they all share for access to care.
II. EFFECTS ON PHYSICIANS' FIDELITY
TO PATIENTS' INTERESTS
Let me turn now to the question of the fidelity of physicians to

patient interests and well-being. I agree with Professor Capron that
this aspect of the traditional patient-centered ethic is of paramount
importance. The commitment of physicians to putting the patient's
interests first in health care decisionmaking is of special importance
not only because health care interests are so important, but also
because the "consumer" of health care, unlike the consumer of
most other goods and services, is in an especially vulnerable posi-

tion for two reasons. First, patients commonly lack the special
knowledge and expertise needed for judging for themselves whether

a particular health service is necessary or would likely be beneficial,
whether it is being rendered in an appropriate way, and even, in
some cases, whether it has been successful. Second, because illness

or injury can result in anxiety, dependence, regression, and loss of
self-confidence, patients may find it especially difficult to engage in

the sort of self-protective bargaining behavior appropriate in consumer decisions when purchasing other goods and services, expressed in the admonition "caveat emptor."
These factors create deep, and to a significant degree ineradicable, inequalities in the physician-patient relationship. These inequalities justify concern about singleminded attempts to introduce
more competition into health care and to rely on a commercial
model for health care utilization decisions. It is not just misplaced
medical paternalism that causes many patients to be, and to want to
be, significantly dependent on their physicians. Consequently, it is
especially important to the success of the physician-patient partnership in the service of the patient's well-being that the patient believe
that the physician will be guided in his or her recommendations
solely by the patient's best interests. Patients have compelling rea-
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sons to want the physician-patient relationship to be one in which
this trust is both warranted and fostered, quite apart from the putative therapeutic benefits of such trust.
One common understanding of this commitment to the patient's
interests on the part of many physicians and patients is that the
physician should seek to do everything that is of medical benefit for
the patient- regardless of its cost. As is well known, the traditional fee-for-service setting, together with an insured patient, creates incentives that make prescribing everything of benefit for the
patient also in the physician's best economic interest. Since physicians are paid for each unit of service provided, the more they do
for patients, the more they earn. In the extreme, a patient with full,
first-dollar insurance coverage has essentially no incentive to weigh
costs against prospective benefits when deciding about treatment.
At the point of utilization, treatment is virtually costless because
paid for by insurance. The patient, therefore, has an incentive to
employ any and all treatment with expected medical benefit. As
already noted, the result is overutilization of care when benefits are
weighed against the true costs of care.
Bundling services together, as in the Medicare diagnosis-related
group system and in capitation-payment systems in which financial
risks of providing care are shifted onto physicians, reverses these
economic incentives. The incentive is then to provide fewer, rather
than more, services in order to limit physicians' or their institutions'
costs and so preserve incomes. The concern is now under-, not
over-utilization. It is important to underline the often ignored fact
(though not by Professor Capron) that new methods of physician
payment of the sort under consideration would not introduce conflicts of interest between physician and patient where none existed
before. They do not threaten physicians' fidelity to patients' interests where no prior threats to that fidelity existed. They only
change the nature of the conflicts of interest and the threats to

fidelity.
Why then is it so commonly assumed that new modes of physician payment, such as Professor Capron discusses, are a serious,
new threat to physicians' fidelity to patients' interests? I believe one
important reason is that it is implicitly accepted that the new threat
of underutilization of care is more serious than the prior threat
under fee-for-service systems of overutilization. But it is not clear
that this assumption is true.3 The most obvious harm to patients
3.

I

am indebted to Allen E. Buchanan for discussion of this point.
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from overutilization is the financial waste of resources in comparison with other more beneficial uses of them. In addition, there are
probably also serious and widespread health harms to patients from
overutilization of treatments (for example, unnecessary coronary
artery by-pass operations that have significant mortality rates), procedures (for example, overuse of X-rays and mammograms linked
to cancer) and hospitalization (with its attendant risks, such as infection). On the other hand, the harm to patients from underutilization is principally to their health, well-being, or even life when
needed and potentially beneficial, but unprofitable, health care is
withheld.
Neither over- nor underutilization will be easily detectable by
the patients who suffer them. Patients' consent is commonly needed
for the additional treatment constituting overutilization, and so
they will usually be aware of receiving the treatment. They commonly are, however, in a poor position to evaluate for themselves
their need for the care. Incentives for underutilization may lead the
physician to fail to mention possibly beneficial but unprofitable
treatment, leaving the patient unaware of it.
Thus, shifting incentives from over- to underutilization will alter
the likely effects on both physicians' fidelity to patients' interests
and physicians' conflicts of interest, but we lack the data to say
which-over- or underutilization-is, on balance, the more serious
problem. I believe this means that we are not currently in a position
to say with any confidence whether new methods of physician payment, of the sort under consideration here, are likely to harm or
strengthen physicians' fidelity to patients' interests.
Professor Capron notes at the conclusion of his article that perhaps the greatest significance of all the proposals to change methods
for paying physicians is that they "recognize that medical expenditures must be contained, even at the cost of forgoing some potentially beneficial care." I believe he is correct in this and that it is
therefore necessary to abandon the traditional version of the patient-centered ethic, which requires physicians to do everything of
medical benefit for their patients. Since it represented an irrational
allocation of resources, its loss will hardly be all bad. Yet if, as
Professor Capron and I agree, physicians' fidelity to their patients'
interests is of great importance, in what new form should that commitment survive? Can it survive if, in the service of cost containment, physicians are allied, as Professor Capron argues, with
society's economic interests as well as the individual patient's?
One desirable feature of a revised commitment to patients' inter-
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ests and its attendant new incentive structures is that physicians, in
their recommendations and decisions about care, must weigh the
true costs of care against its expected benefits for the patient to a
greater extent than they do now. Physicians must increasingly help
patients decide whether particular care is worth its costs as part of
the treatment decisionmaking process.
It is important to distinguish this balancing from the gauging by
physicians of economic benefits to themselves of utilization of care.
Incentives that reward physicians for providing either more care or
less care both share the undesirable feature of linking utilization of
care to physicians' economic benefits, thereby putting a strain on
fidelity to patients' interests. Of course, some link of this sort is
probably inevitable due to the need to provide some form of incentive for providers that is related in some fashion to the amount and
kind of services they provide. Nevertheless, Professor Capron is
correct in that the most worrisome arrangements are those that tie
the physician's economic interest most closely to individual treatment utilization decisions for individual patients. As he notes, capitation payment systems in relatively large group practices have the
advantage of diffusing the impact on the physician's economic interests of any single treatment utilization decision. But it is interesting
then to note that the old fee-for-service system was itself an example
of the most worrisome arrangement; it tied the physician's economic interest directly to each treatment utilization decision. This
suggests another reason for questioning the common assumption
that newer payment methods that threaten under- rather than overutilization must necessarily weaken physicians' fidelity to patients'
interests.
A revised commitment to the patient's interests will then require
the physician to help the patient weigh financial costs as well as
medical benefits and risks of care in order to select what one writer
has called the most cost-worthy care.4 While doing everything that
was of expected medical benefit for the patient, regardless of cost,
did not constitute overutilization under the earlier version of the
patient-centered ethic, it will do so under a revised version of this
sort. This means that one of the difficulties in evaluating the extent
to which appropriate care continues to be rendered is that a new
standard of appropriate care, which is more sensitive to the costs of
care, will be simultaneously emerging. Especially in the context of
4. See P.
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concern for the escalating costs of government health care programs
like Medicare and Medicaid, it is natural to think that such a revised commitment to the patient has introduced a new third party
into the physician-patient relationship-namely, society.
This new alliance between the physician and society may seem
to dichotomize the physician's concern that heretofore had been focused solely on the patient. But that characterization is misleading
in two respects. First, the incentives for overutilization that have
existed all along in fee-for-service systems already contain conflicts
of interest between physician and patient, partially diverting physicians' concerns from patients. Second, it is misleading in this context to think of society simply as a third party separate from, and in
conflict with, individual patients. Society is made up of the entirety
of individual patients, and to the extent that it benefits from reduction in overutilization of care, individual patients in turn benefit
from a more rational allocation of their society's resources.
It should be obvious that I reject the view that physicians should
give no consideration to the costs of care in health care decisionmaking with their individual patients. Those who hold this view
will have different and greater concerns about new physician payment methods. There is not space to explain why I reject that view
except to say that ultimately I believe successful and significant
cost-containment measures cannot avoid involving physicians; physician involvement is necessary to appropriately match utilization
decisions to the circumstances and values of the individual patient.
Another important and desirable feature of any new physician
payment system is that it be structured so as to leave both physicians and patients, when making treatment-utilization decisions,
under roughly comparable incentives and with roughly comparable
expectations regarding appropriate levels of care. It would be an
unacceptable attack on physicians' fidelity to their patients to ask
physicians to limit beneficial care in the interests of controlling society's overall bill for health care costs (or to place*them under economic incentives to do so) while leaving patients with expectations
of, or even worse, entitlements to, all beneficial care. That would
place physicians in a morally untenable position with their patients
and be a sure prescription for undermining patient trust. For example, society cannot reasonably ask physicians to limit the use of beneficial care in a fee-for-service setting with fully insured patients for
whom utilization of any beneficial care is virtually costless in economic terms.
The new expectations of a revised patient-centered ethic require
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something that our society has found difficult to do--openly acknowledging and accepting that some beneficial health care is going
to be foregone in order to use the resources in more beneficial ways
elsewhere. An increasingly competitive environment for securing
patients will not make it easier for physicians or health care institutions like HMOs to acknowledge that part of their cost savings
come from forgoing some beneficial care, as opposed simply from
more efficient operations that require no sacrifice in quality from
"the very best." It is not yet clear how the public will choose to
respond if it is increasingly confronted with the issue of how much
beneficial care is to be foregone. If it ultimately opts to spend more
rather than to forego health care benefits, then it would be morally
unacceptable for policymakers with budgetary concerns to adopt
new methods of physician reimbursement that amount to surreptitious attempts to limit beneficial care. The process must proceed
using criteria and procedures openly adopted after public discussion
and subject to continued public scrutiny in their implementation.
In my view, that process of decisionmaking with respect to utilization of care for individual patients must openly involve both physicians and patients together. If increased attention is to be given to
the costs of care as well as its medical benefits and risks, a process of
shared decisionmaking is all the more necessary in order to ensure
both that the weight given to costs of care is appropriately individualized to the patient's aims and values and that decisions are based
on sound medical information and judgment. I have not addressed
here the important questions about the institutional and economic
details of how this ideal of a more rational and cost-conscious, patient-centered ethic can be implemented. The conflicting goals involved make this task exceedingly difficult, complex, and such as to
admit of, at best, imperfect solution.

